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The 2008 party conventions and presidential debates were among the 
most eagerly anticipated in U.S. electoral history. Barack Obama and 
Hillary Clinton fought tooth and nail in the closest primary race in 
memory, setting the stage for a tense, emotional, and potentially self-
destructive Democratic convention in late August. The rival candi-
dates’ undoubted star power and Obama’s oratorical gifts added luster 
to an already intriguing event. On the other side, Republicans were 
less enthused by John McCain, but Sarah Palin energized the ticket and 
electrified the convention with her keynote speech. Adding further 
spice to the mix, Hurricane Gustav threatened Katrina-scale destruc-
tion on both a physical and psychological level, reminding voters of the 
party’s and its leaders’ inadequate response to the wreckage in New 
Orleans.
Over eleven days between the start of the Democrats’ convention 
and end of the Republicans’, Obama and McCain traded insults and 
leads in the opinion polls. The contest appeared too close to call, but 
McCain’s fortunes declined as the economic crisis intensified during 
the three-week period separating the conventions and debates.
The debates offered McCain three opportunities to close the small 
and by no means insurmountable lead enjoyed by his opponent. In 
addition, the Sarah Palin–Joe Biden vice presidential debate generated 
more interest and press coverage than any before it, in part because of 
Palin’s explosive and polarizing arrival on the national stage but also 
because of the contest’s continuing closeness.
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Conventions and debates generally don’t determine election out-
comes, but they had the potential to do so in 2008.
The Conventions
The nominating conventions for the Democratic and Republican par-
ties mark the start of the national presidential campaign in the United 
States. They are an indelible landmark on the U.S. electoral map, but it 
was not always this way. In the early years of the republic, members of 
Congress chose presidential candidates without recourse to a partywide 
convention. But dissatisfaction with the process—because it violated 
the separation-of-powers principle, was undemocratic, and regularly 
produced outcomes that even caucus members found unpalatable—led 
to the introduction of national nominating conventions in the 1830s. 
The modern conventions that we see on television developed only 
slowly thereafter.
Emmett Buell divides the history of the convention into three eras: 
1836–1908, 1912–68, and 1972 to the present day.1 In the first era, 
delegates, largely under the control of party leaders, or “bosses” as they 
were known, came together from across the country every four years 
to discuss, dissect, and even physically fight over rival candidates before 
selecting a nominee. Corruption and a perception that the selection 
process remained undemocratic encouraged progressive reformers in 
the early twentieth century to reduce the power of the bosses by allow-
ing ordinary voters to select some convention delegates via intraparty 
primary election contests.
More than half the states introduced primaries initially, but high 
costs, low turnout, and tepid support from bosses reduced the postwar 
number to about sixteen. Candidates continued in the main to be cho-
sen at and by the convention in this second era. While a good primary 
performance sometimes helped a candidate win the nomination—for 
example, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy in 1952 and 1960, 
respectively—conventions regularly nominated presidential candidates 
who had not entered or had done poorly in the primaries. Indeed, at 
the Democrats’ 1968 Chicago convention, party bosses selected a can-
didate who had not bothered to enter the primaries: the pro–Vietnam 
war incumbent vice president Hubert Humphrey. Supporters of the 
antiestablishment, antiwar Eugene McCarthy were furious and orches-
trated a grassroots revolt that led to a convention resolution to widen 
participation and reduce the inf luence of the party establishment in 
candidate choice.
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The McGovern–Fraser commission introduced rules and procedures 
to implement the resolution, resulting in a significant increase in the 
number of delegates selected by primaries in 1972 onwards. The result 
has been a progressive transfer of power from the party leadership to 
the wider electorate. Despite a series of subsequent reforms to reassert 
the voting power of the party establishment in response to a series of 
hotly contested and vituperative primary contests and presidential elec-
tion defeats, it is all but impossible today for a prospective presidential 
candidate to win the Democratic Party’s nomination without winning 
a plurality of its primary voters. The job of the modern convention is 
to ratify rather than choose the presidential nominee. The Republican 
Party followed suit and democratized its selection procedures in 1976, 
although to a lesser extent than its rival.2
Although the convention no longer chooses presidential candidates, 
it performs several important functions and remains a key staging post 
in the election process. As Buell notes, “The most important func-
tion . . . is to project symbols that revive party loyalty, mobilize party 
workers, arouse independents, and, hardly least, impress a cynical press 
corps. . . . [T]hese messages are meant for a national audience rather 
than the assembled delegates.”3 Conventions allow each party to pres-
ent to the nation its presidential and vice presidential candidates in an 
extravagant, exuberant made-for-TV pageant.
Everything about the convention—from the setup of the hall and 
stage to the order of business to the words of the speakers—is care-
fully designed for the television cameras; delegates and even important 
party grandees are merely extras to the nominee’s starring role. The 
aim is to give the candidate a “bounce” in the polls. History (1964–
2004) suggests that the median convention bounce is five percentage 
points and the mean six points, but the relative size of the bounce and 
its  persistence matter more. George W. Bush’s two-point bounce in 
2004 looks meager, but it was a positive triumph compared with John 
Kerry’s one-point decline in popularity. Sometimes the advantage is 
ephemeral; other times, real and sustained. George H. W. Bush’s five-
point 1992 bounce quickly evaporated, but the successful Democratic 
convention gave Clinton a sixteen-point bounce and a lead that lasted 
to election day.4
Some commentators have compared conventions to royal corona-
tions, but they lack regal reserve and dignity. They are spectacular 
but also carefully stage-managed, scripted, and rehearsed. Real debate 
is nowadays kept to a minimum, and speeches are carefully vetted to 
ensure they promote the party and presidential nominee in the best 
possible light, especially after Patrick Buchanan’s prime-time “culture 
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war” speech frightened wavering and moderate voters and undermined 
President Bush’s 1992 reelection effort. The first televised conventions, 
in 1952, gripped America and were reported in their entirety by the 
major networks, but the modern sanitized versions attract less interest. 
The absence of division, intrigue, policy debate, and power over can-
didate selection help explain why TV coverage of and public interest 
in conventions have declined, yet tens of millions of viewers still tune 
in to the candidates’ keynote speeches, and the 2008 conventions were 
some of the most dramatic in recent memory.
The Democratic Party held its 2008 convention in the Pepsi Center, 
Denver, Colorado, on August 25–28. The party’s early primaries did 
not lead, as most observers and party insiders had expected, to the 
anointment of Hillary Clinton as nominee. Barack Obama’s Iowa vic-
tory and tight second place to Clinton in New Hampshire set up the 
closest primary contest in memory. Obama consistently enjoyed a small 
lead in the delegate count, but Clinton refused to give in. She said she 
would take the contest all the way to Denver, where she hoped the 
“superdelegates”—unpledged delegates drawn from the party establish-
ment and constituting about 20 percent of all delegates—would cast 
decisive votes in her favor. The two campaign teams worked ceaselessly 
to win over the superdelegates, with some uncommitted ones receiving 
personal attention from the candidates themselves. Moreover, Clinton’s 
lawyers sought to reseat Florida’s and Michigan’s delegates, who had 
been excluded because the states breached party rules by moving for-
ward their primaries.
John McCain secured the Republican nomination in early March, 
but the indefatigable Clinton conceded the Democratic nomination 
only on June 7, 2008, after Obama had amassed a mathematically unas-
sailable lead among delegates and declared superdelegates. Democratic 
strategists worried that McCain was enjoying a free ride while Obama 
and Clinton were damaging each other and the party’s chances in 
November. Indeed, the McCain team began to air Clinton’s criticisms 
of Obama in its campaign ads. Heading into the convention, relations 
between the two Democratic candidates and campaigns remained 
strained after the rancorous primary season. Polls suggested that many 
Clinton supporters would not vote for Obama in the November 4 gen-
eral election.
The Democrats’ 2004 convention had been criticized for treating the 
incumbent president, George W. Bush, with kid gloves. Determined 
not to make the same mistake again, speakers on the first day of the 
2008 convention attacked McCain’s judgment and competence and 
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linked him closely to the unpopular President Bush, while eulogizing 
the Democratic candidate and his family. Senator Edward Kennedy 
and Michelle Obama provided the evening’s prime-time contributions. 
A clearly ill Kennedy, suffering from brain cancer, was received emo-
tionally by the convention audience and responded with a poignant and 
powerful speech in which he sought to portray Obama as the embodi-
ment of his famous family’s political legacy. Obama’s wife focused less 
on politics and more on weaving together a narrative around family, 
patriotism, and the American dream—although she pointedly praised 
Hillary Clinton in an effort to ease tensions between the two camps 
before Clinton’s keynote speech the following day.
Hillary Clinton, despite real and obvious tensions and despite sug-
gestions in the press that she could wreck Obama’s candidacy and 
kick-start an intraparty civil war, had nothing to gain from extending 
hostilities. It was necessary to her future presidential ambitions and 
party legacy to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to the Obama ticket 
and not do anything that could undermine his electoral prospects. She 
did so in what some observers declared her best-ever speech, urging her 
supporters and Obama’s to put aside their differences and “unite as a 
single party with a single purpose. We are on the same team, and none 
of us can sit on the sidelines. This is a fight for the future. . . . No way. 
No how. No McCain. Barack Obama is my candidate. And he must be 
our president.”5
Bill Clinton’s own convention speech the next day reiterated his 
wife’s call for unity, set out his support for Obama, and attacked 
President Bush and McCain ferociously. Both Clintons, wily politi-
cians making calculations about future power, swallowed their pride 
after a sometimes-bitter primary contest because there was no feasible 
alternative to supporting the nominee-elect. In an act of great political 
theatre, New York state terminated the roll call, the official declaration 
by state delegations of their candidate choice, early when the state sena-
tor, Hillary Clinton, proposed “in the spirit of unity” to suspend the 
procedural rules and nominate Barack Obama by “acclamation.” The 
convention agreed amid scenes of high emotion.
The most eagerly awaited moment and the highlight of the con-
vention was Barack Obama’s acceptance speech on August 28. The 
excitement created by his candidacy and the accompanying clamor to 
hear him speak—he had regularly attracted tens of thousands of people 
to primary campaign events—led the Democratic Party to switch the 
venue from the Pepsi Center to the Invesco Field football stadium. He 
showed no nerves before a crowd of 80,000 and a television audience 
07-Jones-Chap06.indd   119 7/17/2009   12:34:51 PM
Andrew Wroe120
of 38 million. On the forty-fifth anniversary of Martin Luther King’s 
“I Have a Dream” speech, Obama became the first African American 
to take the presidential nomination of a major party. Yet, keen not to 
make it an unnecessary issue in the campaign for fear of stirring up 
prejudice, Obama did not mention race once or King by name.
Instead Obama promoted his patriotism (“Patriotism has no 
party. . . . We all put our country first”). He attacked McCain’s tem-
perament, judgment, and connection to ordinary Americans (“It’s not 
because John McCain doesn’t care. It’s because John McCain doesn’t 
get it”). He critiqued Bush’s “failed policies” and “the broken politics 
of Washington.” He tied McCain to Bush (“John McCain has voted 
with George Bush ninety percent of the time. Senator McCain likes 
to talk about judgment, but really, what does it say about your judg-
ment when you think George Bush has been right more than ninety 
percent of the time?”). And he promised to end the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan while restoring the United States’ moral standing in the 
world. The speech finished with fireworks lighting up the Colorado 
sky. John McCain even released a TV ad congratulating Senator Obama: 
“Tomorrow we’ll be back at it, but tonight, senator, job well done.”
Although some commentators mocked the Grecian stage set and 
fake Doric columns and argued the speech was too long and hubris-
tic,6 most observers were generally complimentary. The speech specifi-
cally, and the convention generally, were widely regarded as successes. 
Surprisingly, then, Obama’s convention bounce, estimated by Gallup at 
four points,7 was relatively modest. He went in to the convention tied 
with McCain on 45 percent support but finished 49–43 ahead.
Whereas the main threat to the success of the Democratic con-
vention was the internal, internecine strife between the key players, 
the Republican convention at the Xcel Energy Center in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, on September 1–4 was from the start buffeted by events 
outside the control of the principals and their spin doctors. The first 
problem faced by strategists was the looming Hurricane Gustav. 
President George W. Bush’s poll ratings slipped and never recov-
ered after his administration badly bungled the federal government’s 
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. McCain desperately did not 
want to reinforce the perception that Republican leaders were incom-
petent and, perhaps worse, did not care about people in dire straits. 
First-day speeches by President Bush and Vice President Cheney were 
scrapped—a not entirely unpalatable consequence given their unpop-
ularity—and Mrs. Bush and Mrs. McCain instead spoke, focusing on 
the storm and the relief effort. Lobbyists’ cocktail parties were quickly 
relabeled storm-relief fundraisers.
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The second problem was the announcement on the first day of the 
convention by McCain’s running mate, Sarah Palin, that her unmarried 
teenage daughter was pregnant. McCain’s selection of the little-known 
governor of Alaska, announced on August 29, stunned political observ-
ers and Republicans alike. As the convention approached, McCain 
faced increasingly hostile questioning about his pick’s lack of experi-
ence and knowledge and suggestions that his team had not vetted her 
properly. But with her commitment to traditional values, especially a 
hard-line pro-life position, a large tight-knit family, including a new-
born baby with Down syndrome, Washington-outsider status, and, not 
least, telegenic looks and folksy personality, the self-described “aver-
age hockey mom” quickly became the new favorite of conservative 
rank-and-file Republicans. The news of her daughter’s out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy initially threatened to undermine the Palin narrative and 
bandwagon, but ultimately it did not. Indeed, it made her look more 
ordinary, more human, while offering a further opportunity to live the 
conservative life. Her daughter, it was announced, planned to keep the 
baby and marry the father: “We’re proud of Bristol’s decision to have 
her baby and even prouder to become grandparents. As Bristol faces 
the responsibilities of adulthood, she knows she has our unconditional 
love and support.”8
Palin addressed the conference on September 3, and her speech was 
widely regarded as a triumph. The New York Times said it “electrified” 
the convention audience by eulogizing her family, reinforcing her out-
sider status, and tearing into Obama’s political inexperience and alleged 
sneering attitude toward working people: “I might add that in small 
towns we don’t quite know what to make of a candidate who lavishes 
praise on working people when they are listening, and then talks about 
how bitterly they cling to their religion and guns when those people 
aren’t listening.”9
McCain’s speech was much less rapturously received. He is a rela-
tively poor orator who never connected viscerally with the Republican 
faithful, but his job was made more difficult by the necessity of appeal-
ing to multiple audiences when the Republican brand was in decline. It 
was important to stoke up the convention crowd and energize usually 
loyal Republicans to campaign and vote, but at the same time he had 
to appeal to wavering independents and moderates, who usually decide 
close elections. This already difficult task was made more problematic 
because the GOP was the incumbent party at a time of economic dis-
content at home and unpopular wars abroad.
McCain settled on a narrative that emphasized his bipartisanship in 
Washington and promised to reform the broken Washington system (to 
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appeal to independents) while eulogizing his love of country and mili-
tary service (to appeal to conservatives), but he had little to say on the 
issue of greatest concern to voters, the economy, and failed to launch a 
swingeing attack on his Democratic opponent. He received the obliga-
tory standing ovation, but the convention crowd was left uninspired. 
The speech was not a failure—in the sense that it did McCain no 
harm—but the momentum and excitement created by Palin’s address 
the previous day dissipated in a sea of poorly delivered platitudes and 
inchoate messages. However, according to Gallup,10 McCain did enjoy 
a bounce of six points, and so the Republican candidate ended his con-
vention leading Obama 49–44 points, having trailed 43–49 at its start. 
But would he be able to sustain it to and through the debates?
The Debates
Once the dust has settled from the national conventions, the next major 
events on the electoral calendar are the presidential and vice presiden-
tial debates. Again, it was not always so. Indeed, the debates—at least in 
their televised form—are a much more recent innovation than the con-
ventions. The first televised debate took place in 1960, when Kennedy 
and Nixon clashed. After a sixteen-year hiatus because at least one of the 
candidates in each election perceived the risk unnecessary or too great, 
they returned in 1976 and have become a regular part of the political 
landscape. The potential pitfalls for candidates remain evident. Political 
commentators still reminisce about Ford’s 1976 debate gaffe that “there 
is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe,” Reagan’s “there you go 
again” riposte to Carter’s attacks in 1980, George H. W. Bush checking 
his watch in 1992, and, perhaps most famously, Lloyd Bentsen’s zinger 
in 1988 after incumbent vice president Dan Quayle compared himself 
to JFK: “Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. 
Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.”
The importance of such gaffes should not be overestimated. Like 
conventions, presidential debates rarely determine the election out-
come. Al Gore’s poor showing—at least relative to expectations—in 
his 2000 debates with George W. Bush could have been decisive, as 
could Kennedy’s impressive display against Nixon in 1960, but so could 
many other factors in such close contests. Nonetheless, like conven-
tions, presidential debates offer high-profile political theatre with the 
potential to inf luence election outcomes, especially in a tight race such 
as 2008, and are therefore taken very seriously by the candidates, who 
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spend days prepping. Debates are among the very few times during a 
campaign when the two candidates share a platform. They allow voters 
to compare and contrast the candidates’ knowledge, policy positions, 
skills, and charisma and allow the candidates to speak directly to the 
American people for an extended time unmediated by reporters, com-
mentators, and election analysts. Under certain debate formats can-
didates can also interact extensively, questioning, probing, and most 
usually attacking each other.
Debates attract large television audiences but have been criticized 
because they reward telegenic candidates comfortable delivering shal-
low sound-bites over less physically attractive candidates who insist 
on engaging with the detail of difficult policy issues. Such criticisms 
may be well founded. They fit a wider discontent that the American 
 electoral system privileges great or even obdurate campaigners over 
competent governors, but it is also true that modern American presi-
dents will not prosper unless they can communicate effectively with 
the public and fellow politicians.11 In this sense the debates offer a good 
guide to at least some of the skills necessary to be leader of the world’s 
most powerful nation.
Given Obama’s noted eloquence and apparently nerveless disposi-
tion, demonstrated well in his 2004 and 2008 convention speeches, 
most Americans expected him to deliver polished debate perfor-
mances. His oratorical skills are not necessarily suited to such occa-
sions, however.12 He was rarely poor but also rarely shone in more than 
twenty Democratic primary debates, often giving long-winded, overly 
intellectual answers lacking emotion, wit, or character. Fortunately 
for Obama, McCain is no natural debater either. He too suffers from 
verbosity, and he appears to find it difficult to keep his temper under 
control. Nonetheless, the debates offered pitfalls and opportunities for 
both candidates—to land a killer punch, but more subtly to mobilize 
one’s base and win over wavering voters, especially independents.
The bipartisan, nonprofit Commission on Presidential Debates orga-
nized a full complement of debates in 2008, to include three presiden-
tial and one vice presidential encounter. The first debate, scheduled 
for September 26 at the University of Mississippi, almost did not go 
ahead. The unfolding economic crisis was particularly uncomfortable 
for McCain. He was unsure of himself on financial questions, and polls 
showed more Americans trusted Obama to manage the economy effec-
tively. As national security issues faded in importance, McCain’s post-
convention advantage in Gallup’s opinion polls disappeared after he 
reiterated his belief that the “fundamentals of our economy are strong” 
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on September 15, the day Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.13 In 
response, the self-proclaimed “maverick” dramatically and riskily sus-
pended his campaign on September 24, halting his TV ads and with-
drawing from the presidential debates until Congress passed a Wall 
Street bailout package. Then, in a further attempt to show leadership 
and reclaim control of the agenda, he returned to Washington to lobby 
fellow members of Congress in favor of Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson’s $700-billion plan to buy up so-called toxic loans to restore 
confidence and liquidity to the financial markets. Obama rejected 
McCain’s proposal to postpone the first debate but also returned to 
Washington on September 25 for a high-level summit with President 
Bush, McCain, and congressional and administration leaders to settle 
on a plan, sell it to a hostile public, and push it through a reluctant 
Congress.
The summit ended in disarray, divided and with no joint statement of 
intent. Congress remained unpersuaded by the presence of both presi-
dential candidates, and the Paulson plan continued to languish, largely 
because a majority of House Republicans opposed it. Several involved 
in the process blamed McCain for hijacking the negotiations for per-
sonal gain, politicizing and destabilizing them in the process, and try-
ing to wriggle out of the televised debate. McCain finally backtracked 
on his pledge to suspend politics and agreed to attend the debate less 
than ten hours before its start time. His ploy had failed either to get a 
plan through Congress or to invigorate his campaign. Indeed, it may 
have hurt his campaign, as evidenced by polls showing that Obama 
reversed his deficit and began to lead McCain in the second half of 
September, entering the debate with a 49–44 advantage.
The First Debate
Chaired by PBS’s Jim Lehrer and ostensibly about national security and 
foreign policy, the first debate yielded no clear winner. Broadly speak-
ing, Obama was more eloquent and persuasive on economic ques-
tions, but McCain had the advantage on security. However, McCain 
was not afraid to rail against corporate corruption and greed, and 
Obama appeared reluctant to discuss details of the $700-billion bail-
out plan—although he tried to pin the causes of the crisis on Bush’s 
deregulation policies, which he said McCain supported. Obama spoke 
forcefully on confronting terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan and 
what he called the disastrous and unnecessary invasion of Iraq. McCain 
sought repeatedly to question his opponent’s experience, knowledge, 
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and qualifications for the top job, calling him “naïve” and claiming 
 repeatedly that the “senator does not understand.” Obama refused to be 
riled by McCain’s criticisms, remaining calm, serious, and, he hoped, 
presidential as he spoke to camera, but he struggled to inject passion 
into his overly technical responses.
The tone of the first debate was less abrasive and vituperative 
than the wider campaign. Both candidates were ostensibly civil, but 
there was no warmth and little humor between them. McCain was 
curt with Obama and rarely looked at or referred to his opponent by 
name. Neither landed a knock-out punch or even a memorable line 
in the debate proper or via the postdebate spin. Indeed, each cam-
paign’s spin focused on words the other had not said: “middle-class” in 
McCain’s case and “victory” in relation to Iraq in Obama’s. Gallup’s 
next-day polling suggested a narrow debate win for Obama—46 per-
cent thought he did the best job, and 34 percent said McCain, with 
independents breaking 43–33 in Obama’s favor—but its tracking polls 
provide no evidence that Obama extended his lead. Nevertheless, the 
obvious physical differences in color, size, and age presented an inter-
esting contrast and suggested the election offered real choice between 
two distinct candidates, even if their words did not always do so.
The Vice Presidential Debate
Before the candidates clashed again on October 7, their two running 
mates met for a town-hall-style debate on October 2 at Washington 
University. Chaired by PBS’s Gwen Ifill, the vice presidential debate 
was held just four days after the House of Representatives voted down 
Paulson’s bailout 228–205, with two-thirds of Republicans in opposi-
tion and a majority of Democrats in favor. Democratic spin doctors 
tried to play up Palin’s town-hall skills, arguing before the contest that 
she was a “terrific debater” and “skilled speaker.”14 Such observations 
looked hyperbolic given the ridicule Palin suffered—especially on 
Saturday Night Live—after her inept interview with CBS’s Katie Couric 
broadcast in late September, in which she waff led alarmingly about the 
bailout and wider financial crisis, was unable to name the newspapers 
she read or Supreme Court rulings she objected to, and promised to get 
back to Couric with examples of John McCain’s senatorial leadership 
on financial oversight and regulation. Although the Democrats tried to 
raise the bar for Palin’s performance, expectations among most media 
commentators and Americans remained very low. She would have to 
perform very inadequately indeed for it to be considered a disaster. 
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Indeed, Palin’s apparent f laws, her undeniable appeal to conservative 
voters, McCain’s age, and the magnitude of events preceding the con-
test made it the most eagerly anticipated debate between vice presiden-
tial candidates in American history.
Similar to the first presidential debate, neither vice presidential 
nominee emerged the obvious winner, with no significant gaffes or 
memorable attacks. Biden avoided critiquing Palin directly, for fear of 
appearing condescending and bullying, instead concentrating his fire 
on McCain and Bush and linking them at every opportunity. Biden 
reined in his natural verbosity and sounded experienced and knowl-
edgeable. Palin, better informed and more eloquent than in the disas-
trous Couric interview, did not implode as many had feared or hoped 
she would. She consistently reinforced her ticket’s “maverick,” anties-
tablishment qualities, while promoting Obama and Biden as tax-raising 
Washington insiders. Perhaps most notable was Palin’s relaxed con-
versational style and body language. She asked Senator Biden whether 
she could call him Joe, blew a kiss toward the audience, sent a “shout-
out” to some third-grade children, winked repeatedly at the camera, 
played up her hockey-mom, small-town identity, smiled throughout 
the ninety-minute encounter, and peppered her answers with down-
to-earth phrases such as “doggone it,” “darn right,” “I’ll betcha,” and 
“say it ain’t so, Joe.” Although postdebate polls showed no significant 
change in support for the two teams and commentators generally 
thought Palin helped neutralize criticisms that she was an unviable 
running mate, only the most partisan suggested that she clearly won 
the debate. She more than met expectations, but again the bar was set 
extraordinarily low.
The day after the vice presidential debate and two weeks after 
Paulson’s initial request, Congress passed and President Bush signed a 
version of the $700-billion subprime bailout plan that the House had 
rejected earlier in the week. If McCain hoped it would stop the tur-
moil in the markets and refocus the presidential race on noneconomic 
issues, he was let down by events. The Dow Jones Industrial Index on 
the New York Stock Exchange suffered a further large fall, there were 
no signs of the credit crunch easing, and there was even a rise in unem-
ployment. Democrats blamed the crisis on Republicans’ light-touch 
regulation and Wall Street’s greed.
The Second Presidential Debate
McCain tried to jump on the populist bandwagon, blaming the crisis 
on Wall Street corruption and incompetence, but it appeared to do him 
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little good. On the eve of the second presidential debate, moderated by 
NBC’s Tom Brokow on October 7 at Belmont University, Nashville, 
Tennessee, McCain trailed Obama 51–42 in Gallup’s tracking poll,15 but 
the debate offered McCain an opportunity to fight back and reestab-
lish momentum as the race entered its last month. Palin suggested that 
McCain would “take the gloves off” in the second debate, a town-hall 
meeting format supposedly favored by her running mate, and Obama’s 
aides tried to downplay their charge’s chances, claiming they would be 
“thrilled [if ] we can just escape relatively unscathed.”16 Palin herself 
relentlessly attacked Obama before the debate, accusing him of “palling 
around with terrorists,” a reference to his alleged relationship with 1960s 
radical/terrorist William Ayers. Certainly McCain was more aggressive 
than in the first debate, but he generally refrained from personal attacks 
on his rival’s character and connections—in particular his relationships 
with Ayers and former pastor Reverend Jeremiah Wright.
In an attempt to win back wavering moderate voters, McCain 
 promoted his own bipartisanship while portraying Obama as liberal, 
partisan, and inexperienced. He unveiled a new proposal to curtail 
property repossessions, but otherwise neither candidate offered a 
compelling analysis of and solution to the economic turmoil beyond 
platitudes and well-worn partisan critiques. Neither suggested that the 
federal government should recapitalize banks by taking an equity stake, 
an idea introduced in the United Kingdom and continental Europe—
and which Paulson would adopt on October 10, despite believing such 
intervention to be “objectionable.” Although neither candidate was 
comfortable on economic details, Obama was best positioned politi-
cally and appeared most able personally to feel Americans’ pain at a 
time of economic and foreign turmoil. He again cited McCain’s sup-
port for Bush’s deregulation of financial markets as a key cause of the 
meltdown.
There were few fireworks, except during a foreign policy exchange 
when McCain again pinpointed Obama’s inexperience (“In his short 
career, he does not understand our national security challenges. We 
don’t have time for on-the-job training”). Obama fired back that it 
was McCain who had made the wrong judgment calls (“It’s true, there 
are some things I don’t understand. I don’t understand how we ended 
up invading a country [Iraq] that had nothing to do with 9/11 while 
Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda are setting up base camps and safe 
havens to train terrorists to attack us. That was Senator McCain’s judg-
ment, and it was the wrong judgment”). The junior senator more than 
held his ground across a wide range of policy areas and did not look 
unpresidential or lacking in knowledge, which given his lead in the 
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polls was all he needed to avoid. Indeed, a next-day Gallup poll found 
that 56 percent thought Obama did the better job, 23 percent said 
McCain, and 15 percent called it a draw,17 although this apparent vic-
tory did not translate into an extension of Obama’s large single-digit 
poll lead.
The Third Presidential Debate
With the economy and his poll numbers refusing to rebound after the 
second debate, many commentators argued that with only three weeks 
to polling, the third and final debate on October 15, chaired by CBS’s 
Bob Schieffer at Hofstra University, New York, offered McCain one 
of his last chances to turn the race in his favor. Following their advice, 
McCain was at his most combative, criticizing his opponent for his 
relationship with Ayers, for failing to repudiate a supporter who com-
pared McCain to segregationist Alabama governor George Wallace, 
for opposing a ban on partial-birth abortion, for rejecting legislation 
that would provide health care to children born after failed abortion 
operations, for breaking his promise to take public funding and cap his 
election spending, for spending “more money on negative ads than any 
political campaign in history,” and for being a tax-and-spend liberal 
who would raise taxes on America’s middle class.
On the tax-and-spend point, McCain invoked and obsessed about Joe 
Wurzelbacher, an Ohio plumber whose taped encounter with Obama a 
few days earlier on the campaign trail had caused a stir on the Internet 
and latterly among conservative columnists. Wurzelbacher criticized 
Obama’s tax plans, which he claimed would lead to his paying more tax 
if he a bought a new plumbing business. “What you want to do to Joe 
the Plumber and millions more like him is have their taxes increased 
and not be able to realize the American dream of owning their own 
business.” McCain melodramatically accused Obama of “class war-
fare” for wanting, as Obama had previously said to Joe, to “spread the 
wealth around”—despite Obama’s claim that he would increase taxes 
only on incomes over $250,000 and actually cut taxes for 95 percent 
of Americans.
Despite the strength of the attacks, Obama had ready a full, mea-
sured answer to each and remained calm and statesmanlike in response. 
He constantly tried to turn the focus to the economic crisis and to link 
McCain to Bush, much to the former’s annoyance (“Senator Obama, 
I am not President Bush. If you wanted to run against President Bush, 
you should have run four years ago”). Although he was more positive 
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and energized than in the previous two debates, McCain’s famous tem-
per appeared to be bubbling just under the surface. Obama was, in 
contrast, a study in composure and easily parried McCain’s attacks. 
Moreover, McCain did not seem comfortable with his critique of 
Obama’s character, having suffered ugly attacks by George W. Bush’s 
supporters during the 2000 Republican primaries and promised not 
to indulge in them himself, and he moved on quickly. According to a 
Washington Post/ABC poll, Obama’s strategy to promote a presidential 
image to offset doubts about his experience and judgment appeared to 
be working. A majority of Americans now thought he had the requisite 
experience to be president, more cited him than McCain as the stron-
ger leader, and more thought McCain was a riskier pick than Obama 
for the top job.18
Aftermath
The day after the last debate, Obama felt it necessary to warn support-
ers against overconfidence, referring to his New Hampshire primary 
loss to Senator Clinton: “I’ve been in these positions before when we 
were favored and the press starts getting carried away and we end up 
getting spanked.”19 McCain, meanwhile, rekindled what he thought 
was a game-changing invention in the presidential race—“I thought 
I did pretty well [in the debate, but] the real winner last night was 
Joe the Plumber. Joe’s the man. He won, and small business won 
across America. . . . The American people are not going to let Senator 
Obama raise their taxes”20—but the press hysteria surrounding Joe 
meant McCain lost control of the narrative. The press besieged the 
Ohio plumber. Stories emerged that he did not own a plumbing license 
and owed more than $1,000 in state taxes, and he was also forced to 
acknowledge that Obama’s plan would result in a personal tax reduc-
tion given his current income.
Next-day polling by Gallup showed that although McCain thought 
he had done the better job, the American people did not. Only 30 
percent gave him the third debate, and 56 percent said Obama won 
it. Moreover, a net 22 percent felt more favorable toward Obama, and 
McCain’s overall favorability rating fell by eight points.21 Obama had 
good reason to caution against postdebate hubris, however. His apparent 
triumph in the third debate, as in the previous two, did not engender a 
significant fillip in the opinion polls. Gallup’s tracking poll estimated 
his lead on October 17 at eight points among registered voters, roughly 
where it had been all month, but among likely voters the margin was 
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only four or two points, depending on the measure. Moreover, over 
many years Gallup’s postdebate polling had regularly awarded vic-
tory to Democratic candidates whereas voters in November frequently 
favored Republicans.
Yet, over the course of the debates, it was clear that the political 
environment was against McCain, in part because of continuing prob-
lems in Iraq and Afghanistan, but largely because of the economic cri-
sis. Republicans in 2008, as in 1932, did not have the economic toolkit 
and the political language to convince voters that they had the solution 
to the deepening crisis. McCain’s poll ratings declined steadily through 
September and October, in the main because of economic factors out-
side the control of his campaign. The debates offered him three oppor-
tunities to get back in the game, but he failed to deliver a killer punch 
or even a memorable line. He made Joe the Plumber famous, but Joe, 
a middle-class everyman, could not restore McCain’s fortunes. In con-
trast, Obama did not need to knock McCain out. The debates instead 
offered the opportunity to sideline questions over his experience and 
judgment, an opportunity he took almost effortlessly. He lived up to 
his nickname, “No Drama Obama,” and delivered steady, composed, 
presidential performances.
Notes
1. Emmett H. Buell Jr., “The National Nominating Convention,” in Enduring Controversies in 
Presidential Nominating Politics, ed. Emmett H. Buell Jr. and William G. Mayer (Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004).
2. Buell, “The National Nominating Convention”; Robert E. DiClerico, “Evolution of the 
Presidential Nominating Process,” in Choosing Our Choices: Debating the Presidential Nominating 
Process, ed. Robert E. DiClerico and James W. Davis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000).
3. Buell, “The National Nominating Convention,” 105.
4. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Conventions Typically Result in Five-Point Bounce,” Gallup.com, 
August 20, 2008, www.gallup.com/poll/109702/Conventions-Typically-Result-FivePoint-
Bounce.aspx.
5. http://www.demconvention.com/hillary-rodham-clinton/.
6. William Safire, “The Audacity of Hype,” New York Times, August 31, 2008. http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/08/31/opinion/31safire.html
7. “Gallup Daily: Obama Maintains 6-Point Lead, 49% to 43%,” Gallup.com, September 1, 
2008, www.gallup.com/poll/109954/Gallup-Daily-Obama-Maintains-6Point-Lead-49-43.
aspx.
8. Monica Davey, “Palin Daughter’s Pregnancy Interrupts GOP Convention Script,” New York 
Times, September 2, 2008.
9. Elisabeth Bumiller and Michael Cooper, “Palin Assails Critics and Electrifies Party,” New York 
Times, September 4, 2008.
07-Jones-Chap06.indd   130 7/17/2009   12:34:51 PM
The Conventions and Debates 131
10. “Gallup Daily: McCain’s Bounce Gives Him 5-Point Lead,” Gallup.com, September 8, 
2008, www.gallup.com/poll/110110/Gallup-Daily-McCains-Bounce-Gives-Him-5 Point-
Lead.aspx.
11. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 1993); Richard Rose, The Postmodern President: George Bush Meets the World (Chatham, 
NJ: Chatham House, 1991).
12. John Broder, “Obama Carries Uneven Record as Debater to First Contest with McCain,” 
New York Times, September 23, 2008.
13. Lydia Saad, Jeffrey M. Jones, and Frank Newport, “Obama’s Road to the White House: A 
Gallup Review,” Gallup.com, November 5, 2008, www.gallup.com/poll/111742/Obamas-
Road-White-House-Gallup-Review.aspx.
14. Mike Allen, “Obama Campaign Calls Palin a ‘Terrif ic Debater,’ ” Politico.com, September 
27, 2008, www.politico.com/news/stories/0908/14014.html.
15. “Gallup Daily: 9-Point Obama Lead Ties Campaign High,” Gallup.com, October 7, 2008, 
www.gallup.com/poll/111004/Gallup-Daily-9Point-Obama-Lead-Ties-Campaign-High.
aspx.
16. Jim Rutenberg, “The Next Day, a New Debate on Who Won,” New York Times, September 
28, 2008.
17. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Obama Rated as Winner of Second Presidential Debate,” Gallup.
com, October 9, 2008, www.gallup.com/poll/111058/Obama-Rated-Winner-Second-
Presidential-Debate.aspx.
18. Dan Balz, “Aggressive Underdog vs. Cool Counterpuncher,” Washington Post, October 16, 
2008.
19. Dan Balz and Shailagh Murray, “As McCain’s Road Gets Steeper, Obama Warns of 
Overconfidence,” Washington Post, October 17, 2008.
20. Ibid.
21. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Obama Viewed as Winner of Third Debate,” Gallup.com, October 17, 
2008, www.gallup.com/poll/111256/Obama-Viewed-Winner-Third-Debate.aspx.
07-Jones-Chap06.indd   131 7/17/2009   12:34:52 PM
